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Mechanisms in clinical practice: use and justification 
 
Abstract. While the importance of mechanisms in determining causality in medicine is currently the 
subject of active debate, the role of mechanistic reasoning in clinical practice has received far less 
attention. In this paper we look at this question in the context of the treatment of a particular individual, 
and argue that evidence of mechanisms is indeed key to various aspects of clinical practice, including 
assessing population-level research reports, diagnostic as well as therapeutic decision making, and the 
assessment of treatment effects. We use the pulmonary condition bronchiectasis as a source of 




With the advent of evidence-based medicine (EBM), the traditional role of mechanistic understanding 
and pathophysiologic reasoning in the clinical practice of medicine has been de-emphasized (Evidence-
Based Medicine Working Group 1992). Considered less reliable than the results of population-based 
research, particularly for therapeutic decision making, mechanistic understanding and pathophysiologic 
reasoning have been relegated to the lowest tiers of “evidence” hierarchies (Guyatt and Rennie 2002), 
excluded from clinical practice guideline development (Guyatt, Oxman et al. 2008), and discouraged in 
clinical practice (Howick 2011).  Much of the concern, caution, and criticism regarding mechanistic 
reasoning for clinical medicine relates to our often incomplete understanding of biological mechanisms 
and their complexity. In this paper, we argue that mechanisms remain central to clinical practice, and 
rightly so. Mechanistic reasoning enters into clinical decision making at multiple stages, with each use 
justified in a different manner.  
For the purposes of this paper, we take the term ‘mechanism’ to refer to a complex-systems 
mechanism, i.e., entities and activities organized in such a way as to explain some phenomenon of 
interest (Ilari and Williamson 2012), or a mechanistic process, i.e., a spatiotemporally contiguous 
process along which a signal is propagated (Salmon 1998), or a combination of the two. ‘Mechanistic 
evidence’ will be used to refer to evidence of a mechanism, i.e., evidence of either the existence or 
features of the mechanism.  In contrast, we use ‘mechanistic reasoning’ to describe reasoning from 
previously established mechanisms or mechanistic hypotheses to other conclusions.  Mechanistic 
reasoning in clinical practice, then, is reasoning from mechanistic understanding to conclusions 
regarding patient care. Reliance on such reasoning to warrant a clinical claim may be called the 
‘pathophysiologic rationale’ for that clinical conclusion.  
In the following sections we describe the ways in which clinicians rely upon mechanistic reasoning in 
practice. In each case, we provide contemporary examples and offer, or refer to, justification for the use 
of mechanistic reasoning in that context. In §1.1, we start by providing a brief background description of 
bronchiectasis, a medical condition that will serve as an example throughout the paper.  In §2 we 
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discuss the way clinicians use mechanisms in their assessment of the reports of population-based clinical 
research. We argue that mechanistic descriptions of biologic plausibility serve either to shift clinician’s 
prior probability regarding an intervention or support a claim of causal effectiveness. In §3, we look at 
several ways in which mechanistic reasoning enters into the provision of care for individual patients. Our 
primary focus centers on individualized diagnostic and therapeutic decision making (§3.1). We argue 
that the use of mechanistic reasoning is warranted, regardless of whether clinicians are employing 
analogic reasoning (§3.1.1) or extrapolating from reference classes (§3.1.2). In §3.1.3 we respond to 
objections to the use of mechanistic reasoning to extrapolate from population-level research. Clinicians 
also use mechanistic reasoning to aid the assessment of treatment effects (§3.2) as well as to bolster 
confidence in a particular decision (§3.3). We conclude (in §4) that mechanistic reasoning will remain 
integral to the clinical practice of medicine.  
Examination of the clinical reliance upon pathophysiologic rationale will be limited here to the care of 
individual patients—we will not consider guideline development nor medical science. This examination 
will not presuppose, in the manner of ‘evidence’ hierarchies, the superiority of population-level research 
over mechanistic reasoning in clinical practice. While we certainly acknowledge that mechanistic 
understanding in medicine remains incomplete and mechanistic reasoning remains fallible, neither of 
these features lead to the conclusion that mechanistic reasoning is strictly inferior to reasoning on the 
basis of clinical studies in clinical practice. Examining the roles pathophysiologic rationale continues to 
play in clinical medicine and the justification underlying such use is vital to ensuring that clinicians 
understand both the value and the limitations of this form of reasoning.  
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize that we do not argue that the importance of 
mechanistic evidence obviates the need for clinical studies. Our claim is that both have a crucial place in 
clinical practice. Improvements to clinical practice can be better achieved by understanding the ways in 
which these two forms of evidence support each other than by taking one form of evidence to have 
primacy over the other. 
1.1 BRONCHIECTASIS 
 
Bronchiectasis is a pulmonary condition characterized by chronic inflammation and infection of the 
airways. Persons with advanced bronchiectasis almost always have a chronic cough productive of large 
amounts of thick sputum resulting from persistent bacterial infection. This chronic infection can be 
suppressed but not eradicated with antibiotics. The airways themselves lose integrity, becoming dilated 
and mucus-filled, resulting in difficulty moving air in and, particularly, out of the lungs. Persons with 
bronchiectasis tend to experience episodes of worsening symptoms, often triggered by viral infections, 
termed exacerbations. Once advanced, bronchiectasis is progressive and irreversible, resulting in 
gradual decline in lung function. The natural history of bronchiectasis may lead to death from 
progressive respiratory failure. End-stage bronchiectasis is thus an indication for lung transplantation. 
Bronchiectasis can arise in a variety of ways, although in North America and Europe perhaps the most 
common single etiology is cystic fibrosis. Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a recessive genetic disorder that results in 
a loss or reduction of function in the cystic fibrosis trans-membrane conductance regulator (CFTR), a 
chloride channel protein that is normally present on the cell surface in a variety of tissues, including 
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airway lining cells. The mechanisms by which loss of CFTR leads to the clinical manifestations of CF, 
including bronchiectasis, are not fully understood.  
Bronchiectasis may also be the consequence of a myriad of other etiologies, including direct airway 
inhalational injury or obstruction, immune deficiencies resulting in recurrent airway infections, systemic 
inflammatory disorders, and genetic or acquired disorders of ciliary function. In clinical practice, the 
disorder is often divided into either CF or non-CF bronchiectasis. Bronchiectasis will provide a 
contemporary and clinically relevant illustration of the ongoing importance of a mechanistic 
understanding for clinical practice. 
 
2 ASSESSING REPORTS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
 
Reports of clinical research of new interventions or an expanded use of approved therapies virtually 
always contain some description of the biologic plausibility of the drug or device being studied. Biologic 
plausibility refers to the likelihood that a suggested mechanism of action can be posited by which the 
agent being studied affects the outcome being measured. For instance, in a recently published study of 
apalutamide for metastatic prostate cancer, the third paragraph of the introduction describes 
mechanistically the anti-androgen effects of the agent, explaining why that may be beneficial for disease 
treatment (Smith, Saad et al. 2018). The inclusion of a sentence or paragraph advancing a mechanism of 
action underlying the intervention is not an explicit requirement for medical publication, as are 
descriptions of the randomization protocol or details of the statistical analysis. Yet the ubiquity of these 
mechanistic preambles suggests they serve some important purpose. 
Describing biologic plausibility might be seen as simply a justification on the part of researchers for why 
they chose to invest the time, energy and money to perform a particular study. In an era of targeted 
drug development, biologic plausibility may underlie the process of a drug’s development entirely.  
Rather than a simple description, however, these mechanistic justifications in published reports suggest 
an intention to influence and/or aid the primary readers, clinicians.  
For studies reporting positive findings of a new intervention or application, advancing a mechanistic 
argument as prelude may serve two possible clinical functions. First, a mechanistic reason for why the 
treatment would seem likely to be effective may provide background knowledge for the reader. This 
background knowledge, particularly if new, serves to instill in the reader a high prior probability that the 
intervention is effective, making statistical evidence of effect more compelling. That is, a clinician is 
more likely to believe the results of any positive study, regardless of the associated p-value, if she holds 
a strong prior belief that the treatment should work (Rubenfeld 2001). Convincing biologic plausibility 
makes for strong priors. 
Alternatively, clinicians may view mechanistic rationale as explicit evidence supporting a causal 
effectiveness claim. Even in an era of evidence-based medicine, the scientific training and biologic 
understanding of clinicians predisposes them to think of causes in mechanistic, rather than probabilistic, 
terms. Even when insisting upon statistical demonstration of effect, clinicians want to know why and 
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how a treatment works.  Indeed, plausibility was one of Bradford Hill’s 9 proposed types of evidentiary 
support for determining causation (Hill 1965). More recently, Russo and Williamson (2007) argued that 
to establish a causative claim in medicine, one normally needs to establish both that a cause makes a 
(statistical) difference to an outcome and that there is a mechanism from the cause to the effect (see 
also Williamson 2019).  Clinicians may seek, and even demand, mechanistic evidence before believing 
that a statistical difference alone demonstrates that a study treatment caused the observed outcomes. 
The importance of a mechanism for establishing causality may be easier seen in cases where there 
seems to be no plausible mechanism of action yet statistical evidence supports a claim of effectiveness. 
Failing to find a plausible mechanism of action may lead clinicians to view statistical associations as 
spurious (Jerkert 2015).  Examples include ultra-high dilution homeopathy (where not a single molecule 
of the active ingredient remains in solution) and retroactive intercessory prayer (Williamson 2019).  In 
these cases where basic principles of biology cannot accommodate a cause and effect relationship, the 
results of association studies are generally dismissed as the result of mere chance.  Such examples are 
relatively rare in clinical medicine, as the total absence of a plausible mechanism to explain any 
discovered potential association serves to discourage clinical researchers from pursuing such studies. 
When a statistical association is discovered in population-level research despite strong biologic 
implausibility, for instance with acupuncture for pain relief, the result is often a search for a heretofore 
undiscovered mechanism to support a causal connection (Zhuang, Xing et al. 2013). 
Not all claims of biologic plausibility are equally credible. While a complete understanding of mechanism 
is not necessary to assert biologic plausibility, mechanisms that are only hypothesized, poorly 
understood, or only peripherally related to the process being studied serve as weak influencers of prior 
probabilities or as weak support for a causal claim. For instance, the report of the initial randomized 
clinical trial of recombinant human activated protein C (drotrecogin alfa) for sepsis contained an 
extensive discussion, including a figure, regarding possible mechanisms of action (Bernard, Vincent et al. 
2001). The fact that the assertion of biologic plausibility in this case required tremendous effort, relying 
heavily upon speculation and emphasizing effects upon parts of the sepsis cascade not generally seen as 
crucial to outcome, meant that it was not particularly compelling to many clinicians. As critics of 
mechanistic reasoning rightly note, complex, highly redundant and incompletely understood 
mechanisms serve as unstable foundations for predictive mechanistic arguments (Howick 2011). Weak 
biologic plausibility likely contributed to slow uptake of the drug after approval in the US, caution that 
was appropriate given the subsequent withdrawal of the drug from the market as later clinical trials 
failed to demonstrate benefit. 
A complete and detailed understanding of mechanism, however, is not necessary to infer biologic 
plausibility. In the treatment of bronchiectasis, the biologic plausibility offered for new, and ultimately 
successful, therapeutic interventions generally focuses on specific and limited portions of the causal 
pathway leading to the development and progression of bronchiectasis. Agents such as ibuprofen and 
azithromycin were advanced on the theory that the anti-inflammatory properties of each agent would 
decrease the severity of disease manifestations. Alternatively, the anti-bacterial effects of inhaled 
antibiotics, such as tobramycin, served as the basis for trials of these medications, some specifically 
formulated for inhalation. Biological plausibility in these instances proved compelling despite an 
understanding of the causal pathway of bronchiectasis that was far from complete.  
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Ivacaftor, a drug developed specifically to address one small (<5%) subgroup of patients with CF 
deserves special attention. While there are now over 2000 different described mutations of the CFTR 
gene known to result in CF, not all of these mutations disrupt CFTR function in the same way. Most 
commonly, mutations result in very little or no CFTR reaching the cell surface in affected individuals. But 
some mutations allow for CFTR to make it to the cell surface and retain some activity, though ultimately 
insufficient to maintain normal airway function. Genetic variants of this type are termed ‘residual 
function mutations.’ Ivacaftor was designed and developed specifically to activate CFTR produced by a 
single, specific residual function mutation, allowing the protein to function more normally in individuals 
with that variant. Clinical trials in that very narrowly defined population of patients with CF 
demonstrated improvement in multiple pulmonary and systemic outcome measures. Understanding an 
extremely small but crucial portion of the mechanism by which loss of CFTR function leads to 
bronchiectasis was sufficient to develop an effective treatment.  We will return to the example of 
ivacaftor again. 
In summary, assertions of biological plausibility are ubiquitous in clinical research reports of new 
treatments or treatment strategies. Arguing for biological plausibility serves to establish a greater prior 
probability of effectiveness on the part of clinicians and/or support suggestions of causation that follow 
from the statistical demonstration of improvement in outcome. The data do not speak for themselves.  
 
3 CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
 
3.1 DIAGNOSTIC AND THERAPEUTIC CHOICE 
 
The application of the results of clinical research to the care of individual patients, as even thoughtful 
proponents of EBM acknowledge, is far from straightforward. Several clinicians and philosophers have 
suggested mechanistic reasoning as a way to help overcome the challenges of applying the results of a 
clinical study to a particular patient (Tonelli 2006, Andersen 2012). However, as a consequence of its de-
emphasis of mechanistic reasoning, the EBM literature provides virtually no guidance to clinicians on 
when and how such knowledge should utilized (Sackett, Richardson et al. 1997).  
Not all are convinced that mechanistic reasoning can or should play this role. Howick and colleagues lay 
out four problems with using mechanistic reasoning to extrapolate from clinical research results 
(Howick, Glasziou et al. 2013) and Bluhm also shares their concerns (Bluhm 2013). We shall consider 
some of these criticisms in §3.1.3 below. 
Population-based clinical research may be misconstrued as producing generalizable knowledge for use 
in clinical practice. For example, the results of a clinical trial may be promoted as demonstrating that 
“aspirin is effective for headaches”, when the trial itself demonstrated only that “a majority of young 
patients in a select population with tension-type headache had a reduction in symptom scores after 
taking aspirin, compared to a placebo.” Rather than generalizable knowledge, clinical research produces 
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1) an “average” case and/or 2) a reference class for comparison and/or extrapolation to a particular 
case. In either instance, mechanistic reasoning may help to optimally incorporate the results of clinical 
research into the care of a particular patient. While we are adopting the conventional language of the 
debate here, it is worth noting that one could rightly reframe the process as one by which population-
level research can be used to help optimally incorporate pathophysiologic reasoning into the care of a 
particular patient. One is not always primary and the other adjunctive.  
 
3.1.1 Analogical reasoning and mechanism-based extrapolation 
Clinicians often employ analogical reasoning, comparing the case-at-hand to source cases, from their 
memory, published reports, or the “average” patient from a clinical study. Effective analogic reasoning 
largely depends upon the choice of appropriate source cases. Among the varied philosophical attempts 
to define criteria for justification of an analogy, three primary considerations appear in most, and are 
particularly relevant to reasoning from analogy in clinical medicine. A conclusion based on analogy is 
more probably correct when there are 1) meaningful material similarities, 2) a causal connection, and 3) 
no essential differences between analogs (Hesse 1966, Bartha 2016). 
The ‘no essential differences’ criterion covers reasons, not in the causal pathway, to be considered when 
attempting to compare an individual patient to potential analog cases. Pediatricians warn us not to treat 
children as little adults; pregnant women differ in an essential way from their non-pregnant 
compatriots. Age, sex, pregnancy status, allergic history and a myriad of other personal attributes may 
be relevant to particular diagnostic and treatment decisions. Determining the relevance of these 
differences generally depends upon mechanistic reasoning and is case specific. Sex will be an essential 
difference when evaluating a patient for lower abdominal pain, but non-essential in considering 
treatment for acute pneumonia. Such distinctions are generally based upon mechanistic understanding 
and reasoning. 
The ‘causal connection’ is crucial in both diagnostic and therapeutic choice. The approach to a person 
who is blue in the face and unable to speak depends greatly upon whether one is in the audience of a 
Blue Man Group performance or eating at a steak house. While patients with low blood pressure may 
share lethargy and confusion upon presentation, definitive treatment of their hypotension can only be 
instituted upon discernment of the cause.  We compare a hypotensive heart failure patient with other 
patients with heart failure, not with those who have low blood pressure due to sepsis. Determining 
causes in clinical medicine relies upon clinical assessment and mechanistic reasoning in addition to 
clinical studies.  
In evaluating a new patient with bronchiectasis, an initial clinical focus centers on determining the 
underlying cause. This approach is not primarily explanatory, but rather serves to help determine the 
source case(s) to which the patient will be most analogous. Knowing the etiology of bronchiectasis may 
be important to slowing disease progression. For instance, if the cause is recurrent infections due to a 
lack of circulating immunoglobulins, then replacement of immunoglobulins is expected to improve 
outcomes. Such therapy makes no sense for other etiologies. Given the final common pathway in 
bronchiectasis, however, analogies are not limited to cases that share an etiology. As sputum 
production, inflammation and infection are features of bronchiectasis resulting from any underlying 
etiology, airway clearance, anti-inflammatory agents and anti-bacterials make mechanistic sense 
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regardless of etiology. Given a robust clinical research infrastructure and funding source, many of these 
agents were initially studied in patients with CF (McShane et al. 2013). When found beneficial in that 
population, clinicians used pathophysiological reasoning to extrapolate to non-CF bronchiectasis, which 
is similarly characterized by inflammation and infection. Subsequent clinical studies, though not of the 
same rigor as those done in CF, have added support for the use of several of these agents in that 
broader population. Hence, non-CF bronchiectasis is analogous to CF-related bronchiectasis in some 
ways and not in others, depending upon which part of the causal pathway is invoked. Understanding 
mechanisms can both establish a ‘causal connection’ between patients with bronchiectasis and may also 
serve to define what is an essential difference between apparent analogs.  
This role for mechanisms, then, can address a challenge that faces any attempt to represent diagnostic 
and therapeutic choice as instances of analogical reasoning. The inference in question might be 
represented as follows: 
   The diagnosis / therapy choice was correct in a previous or exemplar case 
   The current patient is causally similar to that case 
   Therefore, the diagnosis / therapy choice is appropriate for the current patient 
The challenge is that the current patient will differ to the previous or exemplar case, and something 
needs to be said about how to determine whether these differences are significant enough to block the 
inference. 
We suggest that the challenge can be met by viewing the inference as a kind of mechanism-based 
extrapolation (Steel 2008). The source and target cases are sufficiently similar if: 
(i) the mechanism of action (of the disease or of the therapy) in the source individual(s) is also 
instantiated in the target patient, and 
(ii) there are no further counteracting mechanisms in the target patient that mask the effect of the 
mechanism of action.   
Parkkinen and Williamson (2018) identify four ways of determining whether a mechanism of action in a 
source population is also present in a target population: enumerative induction, comparative process 
tracing, phylogenetic reasoning, and robustness reasoning. With enumerative induction, one can reason 
as follows: all previous patients who share certain characteristics with the present patient instantiate 
the mechanism, so it is likely that the target patient also instantiates the mechanism. Comparative 
process tracing requires showing that key features of the mechanism of action in previous patients are 
also present in the current patient, to conclude that it is likely that the target patient instantiates the 
same mechanism. Phylogenetic reasoning appeals to facts about common evolutionary ancestry, and 
mainly applies to extrapolation from animal models to humans. However, arguments from common 
human ancestry can also be used to extrapolate from humans to humans: for example, they are relevant 
to diagnosis of lactose intolerance and to choice of blood pressure treatment. With robustness 
reasoning, if the mechanism is instantiated in several individuals who vary in relevant respects then one 
can infer that it is likely that the mechanism is also exhibited in the target individual. See Parkkinen and 
Williamson (2018) for further discussion of these four modes of reasoning, and Steel (2008) for a 
detailed discussion of comparative process tracing. 
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This sort of mechanistic analysis helps to explain why mechanistic reasoning is central to diagnostic and 
therapeutic choice. Mechanistic evidence and mechanistic reasoning are required to ascertain both 
whether the proposed mechanism of action is present in the patient-at-hand, and whether there might 
be further mechanisms that counteract the effect of the mechanism of action. 
3.1.2 Extrapolation from reference classes 
 
Clinical research on selected population samples, utilizing inclusion and exclusion criteria, may define a 
reference class to which a patient-at-hand needs to be compared. Extrapolation from a reference class 
to an individual patient is fraught. Individual patients may belong to no pertinent reference class (they 
would not have been enrolled in any clinical trial) or belong to multiple reference classes. Research 
focused on a specific clinical question or therapeutic intervention may encompass multiple studies, each 
with a different reference class. Within any reference class there will likely be heterogeneity, with 
meaningful physiologic differences between members of the class. In this context, the reference class 
problem cannot be solved by purely statistical means; rather a clinician must utilize other approaches in 
determining the best course of action. Pathophysiologic rationale offers one such avenue, a way to 
assign patients to the most applicable reference class and to account for physiologic differences that 
might suggest the patient is not a typical member of any homogeneous reference class. (Tonelli 2010, 
Andersen 2012, Wallmann and Williamson 2017). For instance, while there are evidence-based 
guidelines regarding the evaluation and treatment of a middle-aged person who falls, those guidelines 
may not be helpful in the atypical case of a woman whose fall resulted from flying over handlebars on a 
bicycle at high (Greenhalgh 2018). The mechanism of injury matters. Guidelines do not tell you when the 
guidelines do not apply, but pathophysiologic reasoning may.  
Mechanistic understanding is crucial for assigning a patient to a relatively homogeneous reference class. 
Persons with advanced bronchiectasis, regardless of cause, form a sufficiently homogeneous reference 
class with regard to inflammation and infection, making extrapolation from persons with CF-related 
bronchiectasis to persons with non-CF related bronchiectasis reasonable when considering anti-
inflammatory and anti-bacterial agents. But patients with CF due to a residual function mutation form 
their own reference class with regard to treatment with ivacaftor. Unlike other treatments targeting the 
broader inflammatory and infectious pathways in bronchiectasis, there is no reason, given mechanism 
of action, to believe ivacaftor will benefit persons with non-CF bronchiectasis or even those with CF-
related bronchiectasis not stemming from a residual function mutation (unless combined with some 
other agent that results in CFTR making it to the cell surface membrane). It is not simply that the drug 
has not been studied in these populations, there is simply no biologically plausible reason whatsoever to 
do so. The reference class here has been determined by a highly detailed understanding of a very small 
part of the causal pathway that leads to CF-related bronchiectasis. 
 
3.1.3 Problems for mechanism-based extrapolation 
 
Howick and colleagues suggest and examine four problems for using mechanisms to extrapolate from 
clinical research to other target populations (Howick, Glasziou et al. 2013). They suggest that these 
problems apply to extrapolating to individual patients as well, so we will consider their objections here.  
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First they cite the most common challenge to the use of mechanistic reasoning in medicine, the fact that 
our understanding of medically relevant mechanisms is incomplete and can be mistaken. This objection 
is typically supported by offering examples (the CAST trial is a favorite) where mechanistic reasoning has 
seemingly steered us wrong. While certainly there is much yet to learn about human biology and 
physiology, a full and complete knowledge of any particular mechanism is not necessary for sound 
mechanistic reasoning. As the example of ivacaftor demonstrates, understanding a crucial part of an 
otherwise complex and poorly understood mechanism can lead to a successful intervention. 
Furthermore, the fallibility of mechanistic reasoning as a guide to clinical practice would appear to be 
matched by the incompleteness and fallibility of clinical epidemiology (Ioannidis 2005, Ioannidis 2011). 
Just as examples of conflicting meta-analyses or randomized-controlled trials that cannot be reproduced 
do not lead to the dismissal of population-level knowledge as clinically irrelevant, nor do examples of 
mechanistic reasoning gone awry. The inability of either kind of knowledge to provide a thoroughly 
reliable base for clinical decision making is why clinicians continue to seek and appeal to both. 
Howick et al.’s second objection claims that knowledge of mechanisms from tightly designed laboratory 
studies cannot be justifiably extrapolated outside of the lab. But this represents a misunderstanding of 
how clinicians come to their mechanistic understanding. Rarely can or does a clinician cite a specific 
basic research study to support a mechanistic clinical claim. Rather, mechanistic understanding is 
generated from a combination of sources that may include a wide variety of basic, animal and human 
investigations (Baetu 2016). For example, the belief that high tidal volume ventilation is injurious to 
lungs, particularly those already inflamed, comes not from any single study but from the aggregation of 
cellular, isolated lung, whole animal, and human observations and experiments aimed at elucidating the 
mechanism of such injury. (See, for example, Dreyfuss and Sauman 1998.) While Howick and colleagues 
are certainly right to point out that a carefully controlled laboratory study is unlikely to lead to an 
understanding of how a particular mechanism will behave in the wild, mechanistic understanding that 
rests upon multiple lines of independent investigation tends to prove more reliable and useful (Baetu 
2016). Idealized cases, useful for clinicians, may derive from mechanistic understanding of disease, often 
in the form of medical models, generally based upon research in the basic sciences (Ankeny 2007). 
The observation that mechanisms can appear to behave in paradoxical ways represents Howick et al.’s 
third problem with using them as a tool of extrapolation. Paradoxical effects are those that run directly 
counter to that predicted by mechanism of action, for instance an anti-epileptic medication that 
increases seizure frequency in an individual. But mechanisms themselves do not really behave 
paradoxically, rather individuals may have a paradoxical reaction to an intervention. Such reactions, 
however, actually demonstrate incomplete understanding of mechanisms and, hence, this third 
objection is really a variant of the first. Indeed, the effects of an intervention only seem paradoxical 
where there is no mechanistic explanation, or an inadequate mechanistic explanation, of those effects. 
Mechanistic reasoning is thus essential to dissolving these apparent paradoxes.  
Howick et al. identify a fourth problem for mechanism-based extrapolation, which was called the 
exptrolator’s circle by Steel (2008). A first attempt at understanding the logic of extrapolation might 
construe it thus: 
    A causal relationship holds in the source case/population 
    The source and target cases/populations are similar in causally relevant respects 
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    So, the causal relationship holds in the target case/population 
As it stands, this inference is circular because one cannot establish the second premise without already 
establishing the conclusion. This motivates Steel to develop an account of mechanism-based 
extrapolation (see above). On Steel’s account, the source and target are shown to be similar by 
comparative process tracing, i.e., by showing that the key points of the mechanism of action in the 
source are also present in the target. However, Howick et al. argue that Steel’s account does not avoid 
the extrapolator’s circle: they suggest that establishing that key points of the mechanism of action are 
instantiated in the target is enough to establish causation in the target, making the source redundant. In 
response to this concern, it suffices to note that establishing causality requires more than establishing 
the existence of a possible mechanism of action that connects the putative cause to the putative effect – 
one also needs to establish that there is a net association across this mechanism, i.e. that the cause 
makes an overall difference to the effect. Therefore, establishing the existence of a mechanism in the 
target does not establish the causal relationship in the target and there is no extrapolator’s circle here. 
Williamson (2019) explores this point in more detail.  
3.2 THERAPEUTIC ASSESSMENT 
 
Even when providing support for a claim of efficacy, population-level studies provide very circumscribed 
information that may be only marginally useful in clinical practice. Not all subjects in a study population 
benefit from the intervention being tested, even one demonstrated to be effective across the sample. In 
addition, clinical research tends to be protocolized, time limited, and to measure only a few 
predetermined end-points. Few clinical research studies allow for changes in treatments (other than 
withdrawal of the intervention) based upon the responses of individual subjects. In clinical practice, 
however, end-points and treatment durations are not usually fixed. Mechanistic reasoning aids in 
assessing the effect, or more importantly the lack thereof, of therapeutic interventions once chosen.  
Most therapeutic decisions are followed by some re-evaluation of that clinical decision for a particular 
individual. This re-evaluation may occur within minutes or hours for acutely and critically ill patients, 
over days for milder acute or severe chronic diseases or at a subsequent clinic visit for less severe 
chronic diseases.  The assessment of therapeutic effect in an individual relies heavily on 
pathophysiologic reasoning regardless of the strength of the population-level research that supported 
the initial therapeutic choice. In acute, critical illness, the clinician will monitor the patient’s physiologic 
responses in order to judge whether the intervention seems likely to improve the patient’s odds of 
recovery. While improvement of physiologic end-points itself is not the goal of therapy, lack of 
improvement of parameters thought or known to be important in terms of recovery precipitate a re-
evaluation of the treatment choice. For example, there is strong population-level research (as well as 
pathophysiologic rationale based upon human and animal studies, noted above) that using a low tidal 
volume (as compared to a significantly higher tidal volume) for mechanical ventilation in patients with 
acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) results in lower ICU mortality. Not all patients, however, 
tolerate low tidal volumes. If after being placed on low tidal volume ventilation a particular patient 
develops life-threatening cardiac arrhythmias that are eliminated by using a slightly higher tidal volume, 
a prudent clinician using pathophysiologic reasoning will increase the delivered tidal volume. Such a 
change is justified primarily on the basis of a mechanistic argument: a minimal increase in tidal volume 
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will only negligibly increase risk of mortality while refractory cardiac instability will dramatically increase 
that risk. 
Outside of the intensive care unit, monitoring physiologic response will be less continuous, but remain 
vital to providing optimal care. If a patient with an acute pneumonia is being treated according to 
evidence-based guidelines yet is persistently febrile and has worsening respiratory parameters several 
days into treatment, her clinician will need to consider alternative diagnoses and treatments based upon 
the physiologic trajectory. In the outpatient setting, assessing treatment effects in chronic diseases, such 
as diabetes and hypertension, that increase risk of major complications, cannot wait until those 
complications occur. Rather, clinicians will use intermediary measurements and pathophysiologic 
reasoning to judge whether a treatment should be continued, augmented or abandoned. Since high 
blood pressure itself generally causes no distress to patients, treatment is rightly directed at decreasing 
late complications of high blood pressure for which individuals are at risk. Population-level studies can 
provide initial guidance with regard to treatments that can, on average, mitigate those risks. But if blood 
pressure continues to increase at subsequent clinic visits, pathophysiologic reasoning suggests another 
intervention is in order, as high blood pressure is not simply a marker of risk but in the causal pathway.  
Evaluation of therapeutic effect in an individual seeks to answer the question, “Is the intervention 
working?” While a positive answer to this question would require some determination of single-case 
causality, it is a negative answer that is clinically actionable. That is, when a patient is responding as 
expected to a therapeutic intervention, this suggests that the initial diagnosis and understanding of 
disease mechanism is correct, though does not guarantee this. Regardless, if the patient is progressing 
as anticipated, neither patient nor physician will generally be compelled to alter care. As the examples 
above demonstrate, interim assessments that reveal therapeutic ineffectiveness generally necessitate 
change in diagnosis (the presumed mechanistic cause was wrong) and/or in the treatment plan 
(unanticipated mechanisms are at play). Proper mechanistic reasoning in the assessment of therapy 
requires the use of appropriate intermediary measurements. Analogous to surrogate outcomes in 
population-level studies good interim measures will be those clearly in the causal pathway of well 
understood mechanisms, close to the targeted endpoint, and consistent across patients (Aronson 2005). 
Utilizing multiple signs, symptoms and laboratory/radiographic testing as interim measures, as clinicians 
generally do, facilitates the detection of cases where a change in treatment strategy is warranted.  
Certainly pathophysiologic reasoning in clinical practice remains fallible. Additional population-level 
research could augment clinicians pathophysiologic understanding for several of the examples provided 
above, particularly those related to intermediary measures in common, chronic illnesses, by 
demonstrating close association between interim measures and long-term outcomes. Yet individual 
patients will remain particulars, with variable responses to therapeutic interventions. Just as 
individualizing treatment choice usually requires mechanistic reasoning, so too does assessing the 
effects of treatment on particular patients. 
Returning to the example of bronchiectasis, response to treatment is assessed and changes to the 
therapeutic regimen are guided by mechanistic understanding. For instance, there are multiple methods 
for persons with bronchiectasis to perform airway clearance, a therapy itself based on mechanistic 
reasoning. All airway clearance techniques aim to assist the patient in expectorating sputum, clearing 
the airway to improve airflow and decreasing the bacterial load. Clinical response to various airway 
clearance maneuvers is highly idiosyncratic. Providers and patients often trial several different strategies 
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before finding one that works best for the particular patient. The best option is not determined through 
clinical research, but rather through assessment of patient symptomatology, volume of sputum 
production and measures of airflow. Mechanistic understanding, in this case the notion that an airway 
clearance technique will provide the most long-term benefit for a particular individual when it provides 
the most effective short-term results, leads clinicians and patients alike to individualize the treatment 
choice around airway clearance.  No population-level trial would reasonably change this approach. 
3.3 CLINICAL CONFIDENCE 
 
Pathophysiologic reasoning and the utilization of population-level research, despite the tone and format 
of much of the philosophical debate, are clearly not mutually exclusive nor does priority need to be 
assigned to one or the other. In clinical practice both approaches are considered and used 
concomitantly. When understanding of mechanism and the results of clinical research both support a 
clinical judgment, the clinician’s confidence in that judgment is rightfully increased as compared to 
relying on only one or the other. Just as basing a clinical decision on mechanism alone can be fraught 
and fallible, so too is relying entirely on population-level research, given that conclusions drawn from 
such studies are tightly constrained, fallible and not directly applicable to particular patients. While 
there may be examples where mechanistic reasoning or population-level research alone can be 
sufficient, in general both lines of support are required to inspire a high level of confidence in the 
treating physician. As noted above, Russo and Williamson (2007) contend that normally both statistical 
difference-making evidence and evidence for the existence of a mechanism are necessary to establish a 
causal claim in medicine.  A clinical corollary of this thesis is offered here: both the results of clinical 
research and mechanistic understanding are normally required for a clinician to have a high level of 
confidence in a particular clinical decision. Mechanistic reasoning can provide additional support to 
weak population-level evidence and vice versa.  
As discussed above, extremely weak mechanistic support inspired little confidence in human activated 
protein C (drotrecogin alfa) for many clinicians, rightly contributing to the slow uptake of the drug, 
ultimately abandoned, for use in sepsis despite the positive results of a rigorous clinical trial. 
Alternatively, while observational studies and several small trials suggested that aspirin was associated 
with a decreased incidence of colorectal cancer, elucidating the anti-neoplastic mechanisms of the drug 
provided clinicians with an important additional reason to use it for this indication (Neugut 2009). While 
many factors beyond study design impact the acceptance and incorporation into practice of clinical 
research results by clinicians (Tonelli 2012), mechanistic evidence and understanding appear to be 
particularly important.  
In treating exacerbations of bronchiectasis in specific patients, a clinician will have more confidence 
when choosing an antibiotic that is active in the laboratory against bacteria obtained from that patient’s 
sputum, confidence stemming from mechanistic understanding of how antibiotics work. Similarly, the 
strong mechanistic support for the use of ivacaftor in CF patients with a specific residual function 
mutation contributed to the rapid clinical uptake of the drug despite its exorbitant cost after a 
randomized controlled trial in only 213 subjects. The United States Food and Drug Administration (2017) 
expanded the indications for the drug to patients with other residual function mutations not studied in 
randomized controlled fashion based upon mechanistic reasoning. In sum, mechanistic reasoning and 
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population-level studies may provide independent and additive support for a clinical decision, with a 





Mechanistic understanding and pathophysiologic reasoning remain an integral part of clinical practice 
for evaluating reports of clinical research, arriving at diagnostic and treatment decisions and assessing 
treatment effects. Some account of biologic plausibility in the form of a putative mechanism of action 
accompanies virtually every clinical trial describing a new intervention. This mechanistic description 
provides support for making a causal inference regarding a positive statistical association. A lack of a 
convincing mechanism linking treatment to effect, on the other hand, leads to clinicians discounting 
such an association.  In coming to diagnostic and therapeutic decisions regarding patients, clinicians will 
use mechanistic reasoning to extrapolate from population-level research. Pathophysiologic rationale is 
necessary for both analogical reasoning from ‘average’ or former patients and for extrapolating from 
reference classes determined by population-level research. Finally, mechanistic reasoning is crucial for 
assessing whether a medical intervention is working as anticipated in particular individuals. When it is 
not, changes in treatment strategy are usually necessary, changes that will also be guided by 
pathophysiologic reasoning. These uses of mechanistic reasoning in clinical practice are epistemically 
justifiable and will remain a crucial skill of clinicians aiming to optimize the care of individual patients. 
While some forms of artificial intelligence being introduced in medicine forego reliance upon 
mechanisms (London 2019), the focus upon the individual of the precision medicine movement 
necessitates mechanistic understanding (Tonelli and Shirts 2017). We anticipate both an ongoing 
dependence upon mechanistic understanding and reliance on pathophysiologic rationale in clinical 
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